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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The conflict of interest between managers and providers of finance, most notably shareholders, is a key feature of 
the public corporation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). A prominent corporate governance mechanism that aims to 
realign these interests is the corporate board (Nordberg 2011). The issues of board structure and processes, defined 
in terms of board size, the establishment of various committees, the separation of the posts of the chairman of the 
board and the CEO, and non-executive director independence and representation have been central to recent 
corporate governance debates and reforms throughout the globe. The UK is no exception in this respect, where 
since the Cadbury Report (1992), there have been significant changes to board structures. For example, McKnight 
and Weir (2009) show that duality, combining the posts of the chairman and the CEO, is now rare in UK quoted 
companies, and Gregory-Smith (2012) reports a continuous increase in the percentage of non-executive directors 
classified as independent. In addition, the new UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) explicitly states that at 
least half of the board should comprise non-executive directors. 
The importance afforded non-executive directors in various codes of corporate governance as well as in 
a number of stock exchange regulations is based on the assumption that these directors exert a positive influence 
on company performance. This relation has received considerable attention in empirical studies but the results are 
mixed at best. As noted by Goergen (2012, p.282), “The existing empirical literature provides little support for 
the effectiveness of independent, non-executive directors”. One reason for this may be the lack of attention given 
to the intrinsic heterogeneity of independent directors, defined along various dimensions, including professional 
experience and connections. 
One important dimension is that some non-executive directors may also be executive directors in other 
companies (hereafter we refer to these directors as NXXDs, Non-eXecutive eXecutive Directors). Many publicly 
quoted companies have boards that include non-executive directors that are simultaneously serving as executive 
directors on other boards. According to Spencer Stuart (2012 a), among the 500 largest US companies from the 
S&P list, at least 25% of newly appointed directors are active CEOs. In the UK, among the largest 150 companies 
in the FTSE rankings, 40% of CEOs also serve on the boards of quoted companies (Spencer Stuart 2012 b).  
Theoretically, the appointment of NXXDs may have several implications for the performance of 
appointing firms. On the one hand, a company appointing NXXDs may benefit from their knowledge and 
experience, that is, their human capital as broadly defined. Such capital can enhance both the monitoring and 
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advisory functions of the appointing firm’s corporate board, the two key board functions identified in the corporate 
governance literature (Adams et al.. 2010). The positive effect may be particularly pronounced when the NXXD 
already works in the same or a similar industry and thus can bring industry-specific human capital to the 
appointing firm.  
On the other hand, agency theory suggests a potential conflict of objectives when the same person acts 
as an executive director for one company and as a non-executive director for another. It is far from obvious that a 
CEO who is herself subject to monitoring and control by a board can be an effective monitor of another firm’s 
CEO. As noted by Li and Qian (2011), NXXDs may sympathize with the executives they are supposed to control 
because of the similarity of their positions and may therefore make decisions that are detrimental to the company 
and favor the appointing company’s executives. 
Another potential problem with NXXDs is that they may be overcommitted or “too busy” to fulfil the 
advisory and monitoring functions in the appointing firm (Ferris et al.. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). For 
example, the National Association of Corporate Directors in the US highlights substantial and increasing time 
commitments for board members, with one directorship requiring on average 228 hours or about 30 days of full-
time work in 2011 (Lublin 2012).  
Finally, Fahlenbrach et al.. (2010) suggest that appointing NXXDs may simply provide a certification 
benefit for the appointing firm without any effect on its decision-making and performance. In their words, “… if 
a firm succeeds in recruiting a CEO to its board, it shows to the outside world that a business leader whose human 
capital is especially reputation-sensitive thinks highly enough of the firm to join its board” (p. 13). 
The issues raised above suggest that the impact of NXXDs on the performance of the appointing 
companies is a non-trivial question which is important from both research and policy perspectives. However, 
despite the recent growing interest in the topic, the empirical evidence on the role of NXXDs in corporate 
governance remains inconclusive and even contradictory (Fahlenbrach et al.. 2010; Li and Qian 2011; Faleye 
2011). This paper adds to the literature on the performance effects of appointing other firms’ executive directors 
to corporate boards. Consistent with the explicit advantages associated with non-executive directors, as set out in 
various codes of corporate governance and stock exchange regulations, our basic hypothesis maintains that the 
appointment of an executive director as non-executive director will have a positive impact on the appointing 
company’s performance. Our empirical analysis is based on a new rich panel dataset of UK companies that is 
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obtained by merging financial data from the Extel Financial database and director information from the Corporate 
Register over the period 2002 to 2008.   
We believe this paper makes several contributions to the corporate governance literature on the role of 
NXXDs. First, using a new and rich panel data from the UK and a number of model specifications, we provide 
new evidence on the effect on performance of appointing NXXDs to corporate boards. Second, we attempt to 
disentangle different channels through which NXXDs can influence, either positively or negatively, the 
performance of the appointing firms. Specifically, we evaluate whether the effect of appointing such directors 
depends on their human capital in general or their industry-specific human capital in particular. These factors are 
proxied by the performance of the firms where the NXXD serves as an executive director as well as by the degree 
of industry similarity between the firm that appoints the NXXD and the firm where she has an executive role. We 
also attempt to distinguish between the two key roles of non-executives: providing advice to the executive 
directors and monitoring their performance. In particular, we shed light on the capacity of NXXDs to monitor 
executives. To this end we exploit information on the participation of NXXDs in the audit committee of the 
appointing firm. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study of the effects of NXXDs on the 
performance of appointing firms in the UK.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find support for the hypothesis that appointing a 
non-executive director who is already an executive director in another quoted company has a significant and 
positive impact on the accounting performance of the appointing firm. Second, the positive impact on the 
performance of the non-executive director’s firm is stronger the better the performance of the firm where the 
person is also an executive director. We interpret these results as evidence that the director’s human capital creates 
positive outcomes for the appointing firm. Third, we find a positive relation between the performance of the 
company measured by Tobin’s Q and the NXXDs’ membership on its audit committee. This suggests that NXXDs 
contribute to the monitoring function of corporate boards or, at least, that they do not impede such monitoring. 
Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the performance effects of NXXDs depend on the degree of industry 
similarity between the firm and the firm where these directors hold their posts. Industry similarity seems to matter 
only when NXXDs are members of the audit committee.  Overall, this finding supports the idea that the general 
managerial skills of NXXDs are more important than industry-specific human capital. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relevant literature and outlines the 
specific hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 sets out the econometric modeling strategy. Section 4 presents the data. 
The results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Literature review 
The relation between non-executive director representation and firm performance is subject to controversy and 
debate (Goergen 2012). A number of studies have found a positive relation between the percentage of non-
executive and/or independent directors and company performance, (eg. Weir at al; 2002, Mura 2007;Lee and Lee 
2009; Knyazeva et al.. 2013). In contrast, others have reported a negative relation, (eg. Agrawal and Knoeber 
1996,;Bhagat and Black 2002; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Carter et al.. 2010). Most commonly, an insignificant 
relation is found, (eg. Mehran 1995; Faccio and Lasfer 2000; Brown and Caylor 2009; Wintoki et al.. 2012). The 
main cross-country study to date, Dahya et al.. (2008), reports a positive effect of board independence on corporate 
value. However, Black et al.. (2012) cast doubt on the robustness of this result by noting that “board independence 
predicts higher market value in Korea, lower market value in Brazil and is insignificant in India” (p. 937). 
In an attempt to explain these contradictory findings, many scholars have recently turned their attention 
to the issue of director heterogeneity, including demographics, professional experience, and contacts (e.g., 
Anderson et al.. 2011; Kang 2012). One key aspect examined in this emerging literature is multiple directorships, 
and in particular the case when non-executive directors also serve as executive directors in other firms, whom we 
call NXXDs. 
In the literature, it is widely accepted that the appointing firm can benefit from NXXDs because they 
have accumulated significant human capital, including knowledge, experience, and authority. These factors are 
important for board effectiveness. A survey by Johnson et al. (2013), which distinguishes between several 
elements of directors’ human capital, including industry experience, experience as a CEO, venture capital 
experience, and financial expertise, concludes that “…it is clear that human capital affects the board’s activities 
since directors’ experiences and proficiencies affect their cognitions and decisions” (p. 243).  
Many empirical studies provide indirect evidence on the importance of human capital by showing the 
importance of managers’ and directors’ fixed effects in explaining corporate decisions and performance. For 
example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that top manager fixed effects explain decisions in the areas of 
investment, finance, and organizational practices. Richardson et al.. (2003) also find evidence of director fixed 
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effects in relation to governance, finance, disclosure, and strategic policies. Fahlenbrach et al.. (2010) and Chen 
(2008) report a link between the policies of directors who sit on different boards. 
The importance of independent directorship experience for firm performance is highlighted by Kang 
(2012). The author finds that both board independence and the fraction of experienced independent directors, two 
measures of board quality, are positively associated with firm performance (albeit only for firms that face weak 
product market competition). The effect of board independence, however, disappears if both measures of board 
quality are included simultaneously in the regression analysis. Therefore, it appears that both independence and 
experience matter, not independence per se.  
Several papers suggest the importance of distinguishing between general and industry-specific capital. 
For example, both Faleye (2011) and Fahlenbrach et al.. (2010) cast doubt on the importance of general managerial 
skills (as measured by directors with CEO-level experience) for board effectiveness, as compared with industry-
specific skills. Indeed, Custódio and Metzger (2013), who analyze the effect of CEO industry expertise in 
diversifying acquisitions, find significant positive abnormal returns when the acquirer’s CEO had top management 
experience in the target’s industry. However, Aivazian et al.. (2010), who investigate the relation between CEO 
human capital and investment and financing decisions, report that when CEOs with more general skills are 
matched with firms requiring those generalised skills, shareholders benefit from higher profits. The empirical 
evidence is thus mixed.  
Another strand of the literature attempts to disentangle the contribution of non-executive directors, 
including NXXDs, to monitoring and advising executive directors. Adams and Ferreira (2007) show that the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors in relation to monitoring and advising depends on the costs of gaining 
relevant information. There is also evidence to suggest the existence of a trade-off between the two roles. For 
example, Chen (2008) proposes that the cost of fulfilling the advisory function is a consequent reduction in 
monitoring effectiveness and higher agency costs. His model suggests that it is not optimal for the board to advise 
unless its ability to do so is high enough to overcome these costs. In the empirical test carried out in the paper, 
independent directors’ propensity to advise is proxied by their affiliation with other companies in the capacity of 
executive directors. Chen finds that firms with these directors are likely to outperform their counterparts that do 
not have these affiliations. Thus, for boards with NXXDs, any potential reduction in monitoring effectiveness is 
more than compensated by better advice.  
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In general, monitoring by NXXDs is an issue because of a potential conflict of attitudes and perspectives 
when the same person acts as an executive director for one company and as a non-executive director for another. 
As noted by Li and Qian (2011) “…social psychological theory suggests that these directors, due to their similar 
positions and experiences with the company CEO, are likely to be sympathetic with, and lenient on, the company 
CEO, hence not performing their fiduciary duty effectively” (p. 130). Their empirical evidence, based on US data, 
is consistent with the sympathy hypothesis that outside CEO directors are inclined to make decisions in favor of 
the company CEO. 
In a similar vein, Faleye (2011) finds that, in the presence of CEO directors, executives are paid more 
and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance. This excess pay cannot be explained by economic 
factors associated with the riskiness of the job. Overall, the results suggest that potential advisory benefits of CEO 
directors must be balanced against simultaneous distortions in executive incentives in the appointing firm.  
On the other hand, Fahlenbrach et al.. (2010) do not find any evidence that directors’ incentives are 
distorted by having CEOs on the board. In fact, their results suggest that CEO directors do not affect the appointing 
firm’s operating performance, decision-making, or CEO compensation. For the appointing firm’s executives, a 
CEO director simply brings a certification benefit that the firm is on the right path.  
A separate strand of literature focuses on busy directors. The key question is whether directors who serve 
on several boards are over-committed and therefore unable to fulfil the role of effective monitors. The empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of “busy” directors is mixed. Most empirical studies, including Core et al.. (1999), 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Cashman et al.. (2012) report some support for the busyness hypothesis. For 
example, Core et al.. (1999) conclude that busy outside directors on the board are associated with greater CEO 
compensation, suggesting weak corporate governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that firms with busy 
boards, that is, those with a majority of their outside directors having three or more additional board seats, are 
associated with weaker corporate performance. However, Ferris et al.. (2003), who investigate the frequency of 
subsequent securities fraud lawsuits and firm performance, find no evidence of busy directors shirking their 
responsibilities.  
Finally, Field et al.. (2013) report a positive association between busy directors and the performance of 
IPO firms. These firms seem to benefit from the experience and contacts of busy directors. In contrast, benefits 
of appointing busy directors do not extend to most established firms which require more monitoring than advising. 
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The above literature review highlights considerable controversy regarding both the overall effect of 
NXXDs on corporate performance and potential channels of such influence. This paper, based on new rich data 
from the UK, addresses several of these highly debated issues, namely, the overall effect of NXXDs, the 
importance of general versus industry-specific human capital, and the contribution of NXXDs to the monitoring 
function of corporate boards.  
2.2 Hypotheses development 
Based on the discussion above, our basic proposition is that firm performance is positively related to the presence 
of NXXDs. Undertaking the role of an executive director, ceteris paribus, implies the accumulation of managerial 
knowledge and skills that are likely be useful to the firm where the person serves as non-executive director. These 
human capital characteristics can enhance both the monitoring and advisory functions of a corporate board and 
thus contribute positively to company performance. Therefore our first hypothesis is: 
H1: The presence of NXXDs on the board has a positive relation with year-ahead firm performance. 
Our second hypothesis takes account of the fact that the human capital of an independent executive can 
be proxied by the performance of the company where the non-executive director is employed as an executive 
director. One problem with relating director quality to firm performance is that the latter may be influenced by a 
variety of factors beyond managerial control, such as an overall economic downturn or industry shock. Firm 
performance is therefore a very noisy measure of director quality. This issue is addressed in the literature by using 
relative performance indicators which compare the performance of a company to the performance of firms in the 
same industry or market (e.g., Parrino 1997; DeFond and Park 1999; Muravyev 2003). This is also the approach 
adopted in our study. We measure human capital, that is, the quality of an outside director, by the relative 
performance of the firm in which she is an executive director. The second hypothesis therefore is: 
H2:  The positive relation between the presence of NXXDs on the board and year-ahead performance is more 
pronounced if the NXXD is from a firm with greater relative performance. 
As suggested in the literature, it may be industry-specific human capital and not general managerial skills 
of NXXDs that help improve the performance of the appointing firms. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
distinguish between NXXDs who hold executive and non-executive positions in the same industry from those 
who are involved in firms from different industries. While the general managerial skill level of NXXDs may be 
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the same in both cases, the level of industry specific human capital is likely to be larger in the former case. We 
thus consider the following proposition: 
H3:  The positive relation between the presence of NXXDs on the board and year-ahead firm performance is more 
pronounced if the director comes from a firm in the same industry. 
We further advance the analysis of the relative importance of general versus industry-specific human 
capital by considering the interaction of industry similarity and the relative performance of a firm where the 
NXXD is an executive director. Our prior is that these factors reinforce each other, in particular, we hypothesise 
that:  
H4:  The positive relation between the presence of NXXDs on the board and year-ahead firm performance is more 
pronounced if the director comes from a firm with relative greater performance in the same industry. 
The agency model emphasizes the monitoring role of non-executive directors. Chen (2008) argues that, 
by concentrating on the advisory role, monitoring will suffer and firms will incur agency costs. We test the 
monitoring role by means on membership of the audit committee. The responsibilities of the audit committee and 
its members have been set out in various UK reports, the latest being The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
Audit committee members have a specific set of roles and responsibilities including monitoring the integrity of 
the company’s financial statements, monitoring the effectiveness of the internal auditing systems, reviewing the 
company’s internal financial controls, and ensuring that possible financial problems are raised. These 
responsibilities should therefore result in better financial decision-making and better financial performance. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5:  The presence of NXXDs on the audit committee is positively related to firm performance. 
Finally, the reduction of agency problems may depend on the quality of the monitoring mechanism (e.g., 
the capacity of independent directors to process relevant information). We proxy for the latter with the interaction 
of industry characteristics (NXXDs from a similar industry) and audit committee membership. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H6: The positive relation between the presence of NXXDs on the audit committee and year-ahead firm 
performance is more pronounced if the director comes from a firm in the same industry.  
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
This basic hypothesis is set out in the first and simplest empirical model, in which we relate the performance of a 
company to the presence of NXXDs on its board. In particular, we consider the following specification:  
PERFit = βNXXDit-1 + Xit-1γ + δt+ξi+εit       (1) 
where i is the firm index, t is the time index, PERFit stands for the performance of the receiving firm i, and variable 
NXXDit-1 indicates the presence of a non-executive director that is also an executive director. Vector Xit-1 contains 
a set of control variables which are traditionally included in studies of firm performance, δt is a time specific 
effect, ξi is a firm specific effect, which encompasses all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the firm 
potentially affecting its performance, and εit is a random disturbance. Of primary interest to us is the coefficient β 
on variable NXXDit. In accordance with our basic hypothesis, we expect β to be positive.  
The choice of methodology depends crucially on the nature of our data with respect to changes in NXXD 
directorships.1 For example, if the NXXD presence is time-invariant, the fixed effects estimator is not appropriate 
and regressions should be run by year or, alternatively, performance should be averaged across the years. If firms 
generally add NXXDs to the board over time, one might think about employing a difference-in-difference design. 
However, our data reveal that about 10 percent of firms experience changes (both increases and decreases) in the 
number of NXXDs each year. Importantly, this figure is consistent over the time span. Therefore, we believe that 
a fixed effects estimator is appropriate in our case.  
We employ three different measures of performance: return on equity (ROE), which is defined as profit 
after taxes divided by book value of shareholders’ equity; return on sales (ROS), calculated as EBIT divided by 
total turnover; and Tobin’s Q.2 The latter indicator is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market capitalization and 
book value of debt to the book value of total assets.3 We analyse the effect of NXXDs using two measures. First, 
we employ NXXDit-1, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at least one non-executive director is also an 
                                                            
1We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
2In addition to ROE and ROS, we have also examined with return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed 
(ROCE). The results are qualitatively similar. 
3We have also re-estimated our regressions with another measure of Tobin’s Q, calculated as market capitalization 
divided by book value of the firm’s assets. The estimation results are similar to those reported in the tables below. 
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executive director of another company and 0 otherwise. Second, Number of NXXDit-1 is defined as the number of 
non-executive directors on the board who are also executive directors in other companies.  
The elements of vector Xit-1 control for firm-specific characteristics that influence firm performance. The 
choice of our control variables is based on earlier studies of company performance in cross-sectional and panel 
data settings. To control for firm size, we include the natural log of the number of employees, log(Labourit) (Coles 
et al.. 2008). The financial strength of a firm is measured by the variable Leverageit, calculated as ratio of long 
term debt over total assets (Weir et al. 2002). Our specifications with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable also 
include an accounting performance measure, ROE.4 In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problems, we lag 
all financial variables that appear on the right hand side of our regression models. Finally, to control for corporate 
governance characteristics we include in vector Xit-1 the total number of executive and non-executive directors, 
Board Sizeit-1 Ding et al.(2010); the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of directors, 
Share NEit-1 (Mura 2007); the variable New NXit-1, which is a dummy taking the value of 1 if a new outside director 
was appointed in a given year and 0 otherwise (Vafeas 2003); and NX3it-1, the indicator for outside directors serving 
on three or more boards (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). 
We then extend our analysis by taking into account independent executives’ human capital. It is proxied 
by the relative performance of the firm in which these directors have executive positions: 
PERFit= βNXXDit-1 + θREL_ PERFit+ Xit-1γ + δt+ ξi+ εit     (2) 
We define the relative performance of a firm (REL_PERFit) where the NXXD is an executive director as 
the difference between its reported performance and the median performance of all sampled firms belonging to 
the same industry and observed in the same year. 
We then investigate whether the effect of independent directors varies with the degree of industry 
similarity between the firms where these directors are executives. First, we consider the impact of appointing an 
independent executive director who is also an executive director in a firm that operates in the same industry where 
these industries are defined in the Extel database. We hypothesize that directors who work as executive directors 
in the same industry as that of the appointing firm will enhance the quality of advice offered to the appointing 
firm. This suggests that the human capital of these directors will be more beneficial than that of a director without 
such a detailed knowledge and understanding of the sector. However, the relation may also be affected by 
                                                            
4 We thank the referee for this suggestion. 
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competition considerations given that the two companies may be competitors. The model therefore takes the 
following form: 
PERFit= φ1SAME_INDit-1+ φ2DIFF_INDit-1 + θREL_PERFit+ Xit-1γ + δt+ ξi+ εit  (3) 
where SAME_INDit-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at least one NXXD of firm i is an executive 
director of a company in the same industry and 0 otherwise. DIFF_INDit-1 is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has at least one NXXD that works in a different industry and 0 otherwise. Industry similarity 
is measured based on the Extel database classifications.  
Next, we focus on the interaction between industry similarity and average relative performance. This 
gives us the following model: 
PERFit= φ1SAME_INDit-1+ φ2DIFF_INDit-1 + ν1REL_PERF x SAME_INDit-1+  
ν2REL_PERF x DIFF_INDit-1+ Xit-1γ +δt+ ξi+ εit      (4) 
Next we analyse the monitoring implications of NXXDs by investigating the impact on performance of 
having independent executive directors as members of the audit committee of the firm. The audit committee can 
be regarded as a proxy for the monitoring function of independent directors because its main responsibilities 
include monitoring the quality of the financial statements published by the company, monitoring the effectiveness 
of the company’s internal auditing function, and reviewing the company’s internal financial controls. Indeed, as 
noted by Stiles (2013), the role of board committees, including the audit committee, “lies primarily in their 
potential for independent monitoring” (p.177). 
The model therefore transforms into: 
PERFit= βNXXDit-1 + θREL_PERFit+ ψAUDITit-1 + Xit-1γ + δt+ ξi+ εit ,   (5) 
where audit committee membership, AUDITit-1 is defined as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if an 
NXXD serves on the audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we consider the interaction of the audit committee membership dummy with the dummies for 
similar and different industries:  
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PERFit= φ1SAME_INDit-1+ φ2DIFF_INDit-1 + θREL_PERFit+ η1SAME_INDit-1 x AUDITit-1 +  η2DIFF_INDit-1 x 
AUDITit-1 + Xit-1γ + δt+ ξi+ εit ,      (6) 
4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data for this study have been collected from two sources. First, financial data are drawn from the Extel 
Financial database. The advantage of this database is its use of consistent financial report information across a 
large number of industries. Our initial sample contains about 5,000 UK listed companies observed between 2002 
and 2008. Second, information about executive and non-executive directors has been hand collected from the 
Corporate Register. All performance data refer to the end of the financial year as reported in the companies’ 
financial statements in Extel, for example, 2008. The board structure data refer to the position at the end of the 
previous financial year as reported in the Corporate Register, for example, 2007. This identifies the board 
structures that were in place at the beginning of the relevant financial year and which were therefore responsible 
for determining company performance during that year. This feature of the data on board structure is reflected 
with subscripts t-1 in the regression models (1) to (6). 
Overall, there are about 130,000 director-years during the seven years considered. The databases have 
been merged based on company name. While both database providers claim that they cover the population of 
listed companies, only about 50 percent of observations are present in both the firm-level and director-level 
datasets. Our initial sample links around 68,000 directors with financial information of companies. The sample 
was constructed in the following way. First, we dropped all company-years that do not report either executive or 
non-executive boards. Second, we removed all firms that report either negative equity or negative total assets. At 
this point the data consisted of about 57,000 director-company-year observations pertaining to 8,506 firm-years. 
Third, to address the issue of firms in severe financial distress, we dropped companies that report ROE or ROS 
less than -1. Fourth, to reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorized 1% of the observations from the left and right 
tails of the distribution of all financial variables.5 Finally, given that we intend to make use of some lagged values 
in our regression specification, we require at least two years’ of data. The final estimation data set consists of 
3,977 firm-years.  
                                                            
5We have also dropped financial variables and applied different cut-off points for outliers (2% and 5% instead of 
1%). In all these cases the results are very similar to those reported below. 
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INSERT TABLE1 
Table 1 presents an overview of the variables. Among the sampled firms, the average board has about 
7.23 directors and the average share of non-executive directors is 52%. This is similar to what was reported in 
previous studies, such as Weir and Laing (2003) and Guest (2008). Table 1 also shows that 20% of the sampled 
firms have non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms. On average 6% of non-
executive directors are also executive directors in other companies, a finding consistent with Higgs (2003). This, 
and the other board structure statistics, suggests that there is no systematic selection bias in our sample. 
Regarding the financial variables, the average (median) firm finances 21% (16%) of their total assets 
with long term debt. As expected, all firms report positive average performance during the time period examined. 
In relation to audit committees, we report that 10% of the firms have a non-executive director who is 
also an executive director as a member. Although not reported in the table, 2% of the firms have on their audit 
committees a non-executive director who is an executive director of a firm in the same industry. We also find that 
4% of the sampled firms have someone on the audit committee who is an executive director in a similar industry.  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for two subsamples: firms that have NXXDs and those that do not. 
We report significant differences between the characteristics of the two types of firms. For example, firms with 
non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms use, on average, significantly more debt 
than other firms (24% relative to 20%). In terms of employment, we find that firms with non-executive directors 
are significantly bigger. They have larger boards with, on average, 8.37 members as compared with 6.94 members 
in the other firms. They also have a significantly larger percentage of non-executive directors on the board, 57% 
as opposed to 51%.  
The performance measures show that companies with NXXDs have, on average, better performance than 
firms without NXXDs. This is consistent with Chen (2008). For example, companies with NXXDs have, on 
average, six percentage points superior performance in terms of ROE and three percentage point superiority in 
terms of ROS. Firms with NXXDs also have higher Tobin’s Q ratios than firms without such directors. The last 
column of Table 2 reports the differences in medians and their statistical significance based on a non-parametric 
K-sample test.  
INSERT TABLE2 
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5 RESULTS  
5.1. Main results 
The results in Table 3 show the impact of NXXDs on the appointing firm’s performance, as measured by ROE, 
ROS, and Tobin’s Q. Columns (1) - (3) show the results for the first NXXD measure, a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if a firm has a non-executive director who is also an executive director and 0 otherwise. Columns 
(4) - (6) report the estimates when the NXXD variable measures the number of non-executive directors that are 
also executive directors. The results are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. 
Both ROE and ROS models show a positive and significant relation between firm performance and the 
presence of non-executive directors. For example, firms with NXXDs are likely to have 2.7 percentage points 
higher ROE compared to firms without NXXDs. We also find a positive and significant relation between the 
number of NXXDs and accounting performance. However, the regressions with Tobin’s Q reveal statistically 
insignificant effects. Importantly, the results for the two measures of NXXDs are very similar. In what follows 
we therefore primarily focus on the first measure, a dummy variable for the presence of at least one non-executive 
director who is also an executive director in another firm. 
INSERT TABLE3 
Table 4 develops the analysis by evaluating how the effect of NXXDs varies with relative performance 
and the degree of industry similarity between the firms in which NXXDs are executives. Columns (1) – (3) report 
regressions augmented by measures of the relative performance of the company where the non-executive director 
is an executive director. Each specification includes a relative performance measure which matches the dependent 
variable. For example, since ROE is the dependent variable in Column (1), the relative performance measure is 
also based on ROE.6  
The association between the presence of NXXDs and the performance of the appointing firms remains 
similar to those reported above. We should note that the effect of NXXDs is now proxied by two variables, the 
NXXD dummy and a measure of relative performance of the “sending” firm. While the coefficients on the former 
lose statistical significance as compared to the results in Table 3, there is a positive and significant relation between 
the accounting performance of the appointing firm and the relative performance of the firm where the NXXD is 
an executive director. In terms of magnitude, a two standard deviation increase in the relative ROE of the company 
                                                            
6 If there is more than one NXXD then the relative performance measure is the average of the NXXDs relative 
performance in their firms. 
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where director holds an executive position increases ROE of the appointing company by 0.023. This is a 
substantial increase given that the average (median) ROE is 0.06 (0.09). We interpret this result as evidence that 
the appointing firm gains some of the director’s human capital in the form of better quality advice. Thus the 
advantage of being responsible for effective strategies and policies as an executive director also produces benefits 
in the role of a non-executive director. The result is in line with Chen (2008) who reports a positive relation 
between a non-executive director’s advisory function and firm performance. It is also consistent with the findings 
in Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Fich (2005) suggesting that executives in companies that perform well are more 
likely to be appointed non-executive directors in other companies. 
Columns (4) - (6) of Table 4 report the results for the specifications in which we distinguish between 
NXXDs working for the firms in the same industry and those working for the firms in different industries. 
According to these results, there is little evidence that the degree of industry similarity (which helps differentiate 
between general managerial skills and industry-specific capital of NXXDs) actually matters for the appointing 
firm performance. These results suggest that the positive performance effects of NXXDs may stem not only from 
their industry-specific skills, but also from their general skills. Another explanation for the limited role of industry 
similarity may be related to potential competition between the “sending” and “receiving” firms. Indeed, executive 
directors that serve on the boards of competitors may be in a difficult position in relation to the advice they give. 
Therefore they have a potential conflict between their reputational interests and their concerns about offering a 
competitor some advantage. 
Next we interact relative performance and industry similarity. REL_PERF x SAME_IND is the 
interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the company where the NXXD is an executive director and 
dummy variable SAME_IND which has the value of 1 if the NXXD director comes from a similar industry and 0 
otherwise. REL_PERF x DIFF_IND is the interaction of the industry adjusted profitability of the company where 
the NXXD is an executive director and dummy variable DIFF_IND which takes the value of 1 if the NXXD 
director comes from a different industry and 0 otherwise. The baseline category in this case is no NXXDs. 
The estimates in columns (7) – (9) of Table 4 report no significant effect for relative performance when 
non-executive directors are appointed from a different industry. However, Column (8) shows a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of industry similarity and relative profitability measured by 
ROS. Thus, there is some (albeit weak) evidence that NXXDs contribute more to the appointing firm when they 
have executive positions in the same industry.  
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INSERT TABLE 4 
We develop the analysis by assessing the possible role of NXXDs in monitoring executive directors. For 
that purpose we introduce in the regressions variable AUDIT, a binary variable equal to one if an NXXD is on the 
audit committee.  
Columns (1) - (3) of Table 5 report the results for audit committee membership. In particular, our 
estimates suggest that having NXXDs on the audit committee has no effect on accounting performance as 
measured by ROE or ROS. Column (3) shows that having NXXDs on the audit committee has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on market performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. This is an important result because 
it shows that, within the UK context, NXXDs produce positive returns on both the advisory and monitoring 
functions. The result for monitoring is contrary to those reported in Li and Qian (2011) and Faleye (2011) but is 
largely consistent with Fahlenbrach et al.. (2010). Further, it should be noted that NXXDs in our study are defined 
as any executive directors (and not just CEOs as in most other studies) who serve as non-executives in other firms. 
It may well be the case that the sympathy hypothesis advanced by Li and Qian (2011) does not apply to NXXDs 
who are executives, but not CEOs, in their primary firms.  
We further develop the analysis by investigating whether the effectiveness of monitoring by NXXDs 
depends on the degree of industry similarity between the firms they are involved in. Previous research suggests 
the importance of industry expertise of the audit firm on earnings quality (e.g., Jaggi et al. 2014) and we expect 
the same pattern to hold for NXXDs sitting on audit committees. As in the case of relative performance above, 
we analyze the interactions of industry similarity and the audit committee membership of NXXDs. In particular, 
AUDIT x SAME_IND has the value of 1 if a company has an audit committee non-executive director who is also 
an executive director in the same industry and 0 otherwise. AUDIT x DIFF_IND has the value of 1 if there are 
audit committee non-executive directors who are executive directors in other companies, but none of them work 
in a company from the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
Columns (4) – (6) of Table 5 report the results for the regressions with such interactions. In terms of 
audit committee membership impacts, Table 5 shows that having independent non-executive directors from the 
same industry on the audit committee raises Tobin’s Q but does not affect either ROE or ROS. These results 
suggest that the market regards appointing a non-executive director who is an executive director in the same 
industry as positive but that the benefit is not reflected in better accounting performance. 
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INSERT TABLE 5 
Columns (4) - (5) also reveal positive effects of the relative performance on ROE and ROS. However, as column 
(6) shows, it does not affect the Tobin’s Q ratio. We find an insignificant relation for the same industry measure 
for all three performance measures, which is consistent with the previously reported findings.  
5.2 Dynamic panel data robustness analysis 
Models (1) – (6) are estimated without controlling for profitability persistence which might be an important control 
variable (e.g. Goddard and Wilson, 1999; Crespo-Cuaresma and Gschwandtner. 2008). We address this by 
amending our baseline model (1) to include a lagged dependent variable which allows us to control for the 
potential impact of performance persistence.7 Our dynamic model takes the following form: 
PERFit= λ PERFi,t-1 +βNXXDit-1 + Xit-1γ + δt+ ξi+ εit    (7) 
where PERFi,t-1 is the performance of the appointing firm in period t-1.To estimate equation (7) we take into 
account the potential endogeneity of financial performance and board appointment decisions. Furthermore, 
including the lagged dependent variable as an independent variable makes the fixed effects estimator not only 
biased, but also inconsistent. To address this issue, we make use of the dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator which 
employs a matrix of lagged endogenous variables as instruments timed from t-2 to t-6. All our models are 
estimated with the two-step GMM System variant of the (DPD) estimator, which combines equations in 
differences of the variables (instrumented by lagged levels) with equations in levels of the variables (instrumented 
by lagged differences). In addition, year dummy variables are included in the regressions as exogenous. 
This approach also assists us in addressing issues of endogeneity in relation to board appointments and 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Drakos and Bekiris (2010)). For example, as specified, NXXDs 
positively affect the appointing firm’s performance. However, it may be that high performing companies attract 
better NXXDs. Employing a DPD estimator is particularly beneficial when it is not easy to find an appropriate 
instrument for corporate governance variables. 
The reliability of the DPD results depends crucially on the assumption that the instruments are valid. 
This can be checked by employing the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with errors would indicate inconsistent estimates. In addition, we 
                                                            
7 We have also re-estimated our models (2) - (6) using Dynamic Panel Data approach and obtained qualitatively 
similar results. They are available upon request. 
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also present test statistics for second-order serial correlation in the error process. In a dynamic panel data context, 
we expect first order serial correlation, but should not be able to detect second-order serial correlation if the 
instruments are orthogonal to the errors.  
Table 6 reports GMM-SYS dynamic panel data results. The results are comparable to the fixed effects 
estimates reported in Table 3. Models (1) – (3) show that the presence of NXXDs has a positive effect on the 
appointing firm’s performance with the respective regression coefficients being positive and significant for ROE 
and ROS, but not for Tobin’s Q. We also find, in models (4) – (6), that the greater the number of NXXDs, the 
better the appointing firm’s performance. Similar to models (1) – (3), the coefficient of interest is significant for 
accounting performance measures. Importantly, all model specifications pass the test for the second-order 
autocorrelation as well as the Hansen test of the validity of the instruments at the 5% significance level.  
INSERT TABLE 6 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper studies the impact of appointing executive directors as non-executive directors on the appointing firm’s 
performance. Our results, based on a rich new dataset from the UK, suggest a positive link between the presence 
of an NXXD and the appointing firm’s performance. Specifically, the analysis shows that the better the relative 
performance of the firm where the director is an executive, the better the appointing firm’s performance. This 
indicates that directors’ human capital matters, most likely, for the quality of advice offered by them.  
We further find some evidence that membership in the audit committee has a positive effect on the 
appointing firm’s performance. This result is consistent with a non-trivial contribution of NXXDs to the 
monitoring function of corporate boards. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that the appointing firm 
gains from both advice and monitoring by non-executive directors and suggest that having such directors as non-
executives on the corporate board generates benefits for shareholders.  
The analysis has identified a number of areas for further research. First, the lack of a strong relation 
between the performance and appointment of NXXDs from the same industry may provide additional insights 
into the potential tension between advice and possible competition effects. Second, the distinction between types 
of non-executive directors, those already executive directors and those not, may provide a better understanding of 
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the monitoring and advisory roles of corporate boards. Third, the impact of social capital and its interaction with 
human capital may offer additional insights into explaining firm performance.  
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics.  
Variable Mean Sd Median N 
NXXD   0.20 0.40 0.00 3,997 
Share of NXXD directors 0.06 0.13 0.00 3,997 
Number of NXXD directors 0.24 0.51 0.00 3,997 
Leverage   0.21 0.16 0.19 3,807 
Size   6.51 2.05 6.42 3,985 
Board Size 7.23 2.66 7.00 3,997 
Share NE 0.52 0.14 0.50 3,997 
New NX          0.50 0.50 0.00 3,997 
NX3 0.05 0.09 0.00 3,997 
ROE   0.06 0.23 0.09 3,997 
ROS   0.04 0.15 0.05 3,539 
Tobin’s Q   1.07 0.71 0.88 3,959 
Relative ROE  of Exec Companies    0.02 0.13 0.00 3,977 
Relative ROS  of Exec Companies    0.01 0.06 0.00 3,889 
Relative Tobin’s Q  of Exec Companies    0.22 0.56 0.00 3,977 
Audit  0.10 0.30 0.00 3,997 
 
Notes: NXXD is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an executive director 
in another company and 0 otherwise. Share of NXXD directors is the ratio of the number of non-executive directors 
on the board that are also executive directors in other firms to the total number of non-executive directors. Number 
of NXXD directors is the number of non-executive directors on the board who are executive directors in other 
companies. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of the number of 
employees. Board size is the total number of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. New NX is a dummy variable which has the value 1 if there is a new non-executive director 
and 0 if not. NX3 is a dummy variable which has the value 1 if at least one non-executive director serves on three 
boards and 0 otherwise. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity. ROS, 
is defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover.  Tobin’s Q is the market value of the firm divided by the 
book value of its assets. Relative ROE of Exec Companies is the average profitability of the firms where non-
executive directors are employed as executive directors. Relative ROS of Exec Companies is the average 
profitability of the firms where the non-executive directors are employed as executive directors. Relative Tobin’s 
Q of Exec Companies is the average Q ratio of the firms where the non-executive directors are employed as 
executive directors. Audit is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if an NXXD sits in the audit committee 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of key characteristics of companies with and without NXXDs.  
 No NXXDs Yes NXXDs Mean Median 
Variable Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Diff Diff 
Leverage   0.20 0.16 3,028 0.24 0.16 779 -0.04*** -0.05*** 
Size  6.29 1.99 3,181 7.38 2.05 804 -1.08*** -1.05*** 
Board Size 6.94 2.57 3,189 8.37 2.72 808 -1.42*** -1.00*** 
Share NE 0.51 0.14 3,189 0.57 0.12 808 -0.06*** -0.07*** 
New NX 0.48 0.50 3,189 0.58 0.49 808 -0.11*** 0.00a
NX3 0.05 0.09 3,189 0.06 0.08 808 -0.00 0.00a
ROE   0.05 0.24 3,189 0.11 0.22 808 -0.06*** -0.03*** 
ROS   0.03 0.16 2,818 0.06 0.13 721 -0.03*** -0.01*** 
Tobin’s Q   1.06 0.71 3,157 1.12 0.70 802 -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 
Notes: Asterisks *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Mean Diff is a 
t-test for the difference between the means. Median Diff is the difference between the medians with significance 
levels based on the K-sample test. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of 
the number of employees. Board size is the total number of directors on the board. New NX is a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if there is a new non-executive director in a given year and 0 otherwise. NX3 is a dummy 
variable which has the value 1 if at least one non-executive director serves on three boards and 0 if not. Share NE 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book 
value of shareholders’ equity. ROS is defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover. Tobin’s Q is the market 
value of the firm divided by the book value of its assets. 
aThe K-sample test is not performed for binary variables.   
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Table 3: Fixed effects regression results for the basic specification testing the overall effect of NXXDs on 
company performance. 
 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 ROE ROS Tobin's Q ROE ROS Tobin's Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NXXD  0.027** 0.012* -0.002    
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.029)    
Number of NXXDs     0.016* 0.010** -0.004 
    (0.009) (0.005) (0.022) 
Board Size  0.004 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Share NE -0.058 -0.009 -0.062 -0.057 -0.009 -0.061 
 (0.059) (0.039) (0.105) (0.059) (0.039) (0.105) 
New NX  0.005 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005) (0.016) 
NX3 0.073 0.032 0.120 0.071 0.032 0.120 
 (0.059) (0.030) (0.142) (0.059) (0.030) (0.142) 
Leverage -0.017 -0.070** -0.235* -0.016 -0.069** -0.234* 
 (0.061) (0.035) (0.127) (0.061) (0.035) (0.127) 
Size  -0.032*** -0.012 -0.115*** -0.032*** -0.012 -0.115*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.025) (0.012) (0.010) (0.025) 
Lagged ROE    -0.040   -0.040 
   (0.054)   (0.054) 
Firm-years  3,997 3,580 3,951 3,997 3,580 3,951 
Firms 1,224 1,092 1,220 1,224 1,092 1,220 
R2  0.06 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.21 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A constant and time dummy variables are included in the 
regressions but not reported. Asterisks denote significance levels: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity. ROS is 
defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover. Tobin’s Q is the market value of the firm divided by book 
value of its assets. NXXD is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also an 
executive director in another company and 0 if not. Number of NXXDs is the number of non-executive directors 
on the board who are executive directors in other companies. Board size is the total number of directors on the 
board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. New NX is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if there is a new non-executive director in a given year and 0 if not. NX3 is a dummy variable 
which has the value 1 if at least one non-executive director serves on three boards and 0 otherwise. Leverage is 
the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of the number of employees. 
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Table 4: Fixed effects regression results: Specifications with relative performance and industry similarity. 
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NXXD 0.020 0.004 -0.035       
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.042)       
NXXD X Diff    0.022 0.000 -0.047 0.022 -0.002 -0.028 
    (0.015) (0.009) (0.043) (0.015) (0.009) (0.040) 
NXXD X Same    0.012 0.020 0.027 0.011 0.021 -0.055 
    (0.021) (0.017) (0.068) (0.021) (0.016) (0.115) 
Rel Perf 0.050* 0.107** 0.023 0.050* 0.112** 0.022    
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.030) (0.027) (0.048) (0.030)    
Rel  Perf X Diff       0.064 -0.038 0.092 
       (0.080) (0.087) (0.099) 
Rel Perf X Same       0.048 0.149** 0.005 
       (0.030) (0.062) (0.028) 
Firm-years 3,977 3,501 3,931 3,977 3,501 3,931 3,977 3,501 3,931 
Firms 1,224 1,075 1,220 1,224 1,075 1,220 1,224 1,075 1,220 
R2 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.21 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A constant, time dummies, variables Board size, Share NE, New NX, NX3, Leverage and Size are included in all regressions 
but not reported. ROE is included in Tobin’s Q regressions but not reported. Asterisks denote significance levels: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity. ROS is defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover. Tobin’s Q is the market 
value of the firm divided by the book value of its assets. NXXD X Diff  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has at least one NXXD who works in a different industry and 
0 otherwise. NXXD X Same is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at least one of the firm’s non-executive directors has an executive position in the same industry 
and 0 otherwise. Rel Perf is the average relative performance of the companies in which the non-executive directors act as executive directors. 
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Table 5: Fixed effects regression results: Specifications with relative performance, industry similarity and audit 
committee membership. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobins Q ROE ROS Tobins Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NXXD 0.022 0.004 -0.070    
(0.014) (0.009) (0.043)    
NXXD Diff     0.027* 0.003 -0.073* 
   (0.016) (0.009) (0.044) 
NXXD Same    0.002 0.007 -0.041 
   (0.022) (0.016) (0.070) 
Rel Perf 0.051* 0.107** 0.022 0.050* 0.114** 0.022 
(0.027) (0.047) (0.029) (0.028) (0.048) (0.029) 
Audit -0.005 0.001 0.081**    
(0.017) (0.009) (0.037)    
Audit X Diff    -0.011 -0.006 0.065 
   (0.019) (0.010) (0.041) 
Audit X Same    0.025 0.032 0.144** 
   (0.031) (0.023) (0.057) 
Firm-years  3,977 3,501 3,931 3,977 3,501 3,931 
Firms  1,224 1,075 1,220 1,224 1,075 1,220 
R2  0.06 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.21 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A constant, time dummies, variables Board size, Share NE, New 
NX, NX3, Leverage and Size are included in all regressions but not reported. ROE is included in Tobin’s Q 
regressions but not reported. Asterisks denote significance levels: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity. ROS is 
defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover. Tobin’s Q is the market value of the firm divided by the 
book value of its assets. NXXD X Diff  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has at least one NXXD who 
works in a different industry and 0 otherwise. NXXD Same is 1 if the NXXD director is also an executive director 
in a company in the same industry and 0 otherwise. Rel Perf is the average relative performance of the companies 
in which the non-executive directors act as executive directors. Audit is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if there is an NXXD in the audit committee and 0 if not. 
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Table 6: GMM-SYS dynamic panel data regressions results.  
 Dependent Variable 
 ROE ROS Tobin’s Q ROE ROS Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NXXD  0.074** 0.050*** 0.108    
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.081)    
Number of NXXDs    0.056** 0.047*** 0.061 
    (0.026) (0.015) (0.067) 
Board Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) 
Share NE 0.109 0.029 0.135 0.128 0.038 0.167 
 (0.150) (0.090) (0.352) (0.151) (0.089) (0.354) 
New NX 0.025 0.006 -0.130 0.035 0.010 -0.116 
 (0.042) (0.028) (0.099) (0.043) (0.029) (0.096) 
NX3 -0.034 -0.034 0.218 -0.032 -0.026 0.219 
 (0.142) (0.080) (0.331) (0.143) (0.080) (0.329) 
Leverage -0.232 -0.168** 0.168 -0.220 -0.162** 0.210 
 (0.164) (0.079) (0.367) (0.163) (0.081) (0.371) 
Size 0.012 -0.002 -0.112** 0.010 -0.001 -0.110** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.054) (0.021) (0.013) (0.054) 
Lagged Performance 0.349*** 0.260* 0.424*** 0.358*** 0.267* 0.425*** 
 (0.112) (0.142) (0.080) (0.112) (0.145) (0.081) 
ROE   0.051   0.096 
   (0.221)   (0.226) 
Firm-years 3,961 3,544 3,933 3,961 3,544 3,933 
Firms 1,213 1,080 1,213 1,213 1,080 1,213 
Hansen(p-val) 0.08 0.75 0.11 0.10 0.81 0.09 
AR2 (p-val) 0.20 0.46 0.75 0.22 0.50 0.79 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A constant and time dummy variables are included in the 
regressions but not reported. Asterisks denote significance levels: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. ROE is defined as profit before tax divided by book value of shareholders’ equity. ROS is 
defined as profit before tax divided by total turnover. Tobin’s Q is the market value of the firm divided by the 
book value of its assets. NXXD is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if a non-executive director is also 
an executive director in another company and 0 otherwise. Number of NXXD directors is the number of non-
executive directors on the board who are executive directors in other companies. Board size is the total number 
of directors on the board. Share NE is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. New NX is a dummy 
variable which has the value 1 if there is a new non-executive director in a given year and 0 otherwise. NX3 is a 
dummy variable which has the value 1 if at least one non-executive director serves on three boards and 0 if not. 
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of the number of employees.  
